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NOTES
A PROPOSAL FOR THE EQUAL PROTECTION
OF NON-INDIANS PRACTICING NATIVE
AMERICAN RELIGIONS: CAN THE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT FINALLY
REMOVE THE EXISTING DEFERENCE
WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE?
INTRODUCTION
During Prohibition, members of the Roman Catholic church were
statutorily permitted to drink wine during the Mass.1 Given the Catholic
doctrine of transubstantiation (the sacred transformation of wine into the
blood of Christ during the ceremony), this statute was necessary to
safeguard Catholics' constitutional right to freedom of religion.2 The
statute, however, benefited more than Catholics. It exempted from
Prohibition all bona fide religions which used "wine for sacramental
See National Prohibition Act, Title 11, § 3,41 Stat. 305, 307(1919) [hereinafter Prohibition
Act], repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause
Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 314 (noting exemption of sacramental wine from Volstead
Act). See generally ARTHUR W. BLAKEMORE, BLAKEMORE ON PROHIBITION 839-48 (2d ed. 1925)
(analyzing Article XI regulations, promulgated pursuant to National Prohibition Act, governing
use of wine for sacramental purposes).
- "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONST.
amend. I; see Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 913 n.6
(1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting exemption of sacramental wine from National
Prohibition Act, but asserting that government's general interest in prohibiting use of alcohol
would not have been sufficiently compelling to outweigh Catholic's right to receive Holy
Communion).
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purposes."3 Therefore, the exemption was evenhanded, as Jews and
certain Christian denominations other than Catholics also benefited.
A statute which explicitly provided the exemption for "Catholics"
would protect religious freedom, but it would also deny such an exemption
for other similarly situated religions. The United States Constitution
provides that laws may neither prefer one religion over another4 nor deny
similarly situated persons equal protection of the law.
Despite these constitutional principles, Native American religions
currently benefit from protective federal legislation which excludes non-
Indians.6 These accommodations treat non-Indians unequally by denying
them the freedom to partake in the exempted activities which are as
necessary to their religious doctrine as they are to Indians' religious
doctrine.
Recently, Congress implemented two pieces of legislation which
should have a tremendous impact on this issue. Effectively, the statutes
have overruled the controversial 1990 Supreme Court holding which
abolished the compelling interest test for free exercise claims7 and
I Prohibition Act, supra note 1, § 6, at 311. "Nothing in this title shall be held to apply to
the .. . possession . . . of wine for sacramental purposes, or like religious rites . . . ." Id.
' "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. I; see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (stating
that Equal Protection Clause provides "direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike").
5 It is well settled that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (maintaining that it would be absurd to hold federal govern-
ment to lesser standard than states with regard to equal protection); 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 14.7,
at 370 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that Supreme Court "has interpreted the due process clause of the
fifth amendment to test federal classifications under the same standard of review" as that used
when analyzing Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims against state governments).
Therefore, the federal government may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6 See, e.g., Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668a (1988) (recognizing religious
exemption for Indians with respect to laws prohibiting possession of bald or golden eagles); 50
C.F.R. § 22.22 (1994) (authorizing issuance of permit to take, possess, and transport parts of
bald or golden eagles for "religious use of Indians" by Director of Fish and Wildlife Service);
Robert S. Michaelsen, Law and the Limits of Liberty, in HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 116, 124 (Christopher Vecsey ed., 1991) (asserting that despite federal
legislation designed to sustain tribal identity, governmental erosion of religious foundation of
Indian culture continues). Native American religions also benefit from state legislation that
excludes non-Indians. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 29.106 (West 1989) (allowing "enrolled
members of the Winnebago Indian tribe and residents of [Wisconsin] who practice the traditional
Winnebago religion" to take deer out of season for religious ceremonies).
' Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a
discussion of the case, see infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
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legislatively restored the "strict scrutiny" standard.' In addition, the
legislature forged an exception to all state laws prohibiting the sacramental
use of peyote in Indian ceremonies,9 statutorily overruling the Supreme
Court's decision denying such an exception.10 Consequently, government
interference with the religious rights of all citizens, including those of non-
Indians, will now be subject to the strictest standard of judicial review. As
a result, future free exercise claims of non-Indians participating in bona
fide Native American religions should succeed.
The purpose of this Note is to argue the merits of claims brought
against the federal government by non-Indians practicing bona fide Indian
religions and to advocate equal religious freedom for both Indians and non-
Indians who practice the same or similar religions. Part I will provide a
brief historical overview of religious exemptions. Part II will focus on
8 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. 1994); see infra notes 25-
26 and accompanying text (discussing passage of Act). Despite its noble purpose, it remains to
be seen whether the legislature has the authority to mandate a specific analysis by the judiciary.
See infra note 26.
1 American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344, § 3,
108 Stat. 3125-27 (1994) [hereinafter AIRFA Amendments]. The statute reads in part:
(a) The Congress finds and declares that -
(1) for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as
a religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and
significant in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures;
(2) since 1965, this ceremonial use of peyote by Indians has been protected by
Federal regulation;
(3) while at least 28 States have enacted laws which are similar to, or are in
conformance with, the Federal regulation which protects the ceremonial use of
peyote by Indian religious practitioners, 22 States have not done so, and this lack
of uniformity has created hardship for Indian people who participate in such
religious ceremonies;
(4) the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Employment Division
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), held that the First Amendment does not protect
Indian practitioners who use peyote in Indian religious ceremonies, and also
raised uncertainty whether this religious practice would be protected under the
compelling State interest standard; and
(5) the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the religious use of peyote
by Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and
increase the risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory treatment.
(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or transporta-
tion of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection
with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited
by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or discriminated against
on the basis of such use, possession or transportation, including, but not limited to,
denial of otherwise applicable benefits under public assistance programs.
Id.
10 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (denying exception to prohibition when peyote is used for
sacramental purposes).
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Indian-only religious exemptions. This discussion will present two
examples of federal Indian-only legislation: the religious use of eagle
feathers, and that of peyote. Part III will address the Equal Protection and
Establishment Clause claims available to non-Indians seeking the benefit of
Indian exemptions. This section will offer reasons why these claims have
been unsuccessful. Finally, Part IV will discuss free exercise claims of
non-Indians with respect to the use of eagle feathers and peyote. This
analysis will conclude that the recently re-invigorated Free Exercise Clause
should provide an alternative to the Equal Protection and Establishment
Clause approaches which have proved futile in the past. This Note asserts
that non-Indian practitioners cannot be distinguished from their Indian
counterparts. Therefore, a non-Indian with sincerely held beliefs who is
involved in a bona fide religion should be able to benefit from the same
religious exemptions provided Indians.
I. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM EXEMPTIONS
The Framers of the Constitution elected to accord each individual the
right to the free exercise of religion, perhaps due to the multitude of people
who journeyed to this country in search of that very freedom." In the
formative years of the republic, however, the Supreme Court was reluctant
to allow religion to subordinate criminal laws.'" It was not until 1972, in
"See generally Phillip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839, 860 (1986) (analyzing historical background of religion clauses
and concluding that purpose of First Amendment was to enhance individual freedom); Michael
W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1410 (1990) (providing historical context of constitutional grant of religious
freedom); Pepper, supra note 1, at 300-07 (analyzing historical development of language of Free
Exercise Clause). But see Rodney J. Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle:
Making Sense of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 KAN. L. REV. 285, 295-96 (1994)
(postulating that Framers of Constitution did not intend to guarantee absolute right to free exercise
of religion, but rather sought to provide some protection to religion as important value, while
hedging such protection so that superior countervailing state or societal interests could prevail).
In reporting on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (1993), the Senate Committee on the Judiciary recognized the importance of religious
freedom to the settlers of the United States. S. REP. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1893-94 (stating that this nation "was founded upon the
conviction that the right to observe one's faith, free from Government interference, is among the
most treasured birthrights of every American").
12 One of the first free exercise claims heard by the Supreme Court was by a Mormon
seeking to marry a second wife. In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878), the
Supreme Court held that the Mormons were not exempt from polygamy laws prohibiting a man
from having more than one wife. The Court's rationale evinced a decided fear of exemptions that
might permit "every citizen to become a law unto himself." Id. See generally 4 ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 5, § 21.7 (tracing early decisions of Supreme Court in regard to free exercise
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Wisconsin v. Yoder, 3 that the Court subordinated a criminal law to a
religious claim. 4
The most important aspect of Yoder was the Court's decision to treat
the free exercise of religion as a fundamental right. 5 Such treatment
necessarily implicates a strict scrutiny analysis; infringement can only be
justified by a compelling government interest, and means of infringement
must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 6 The Yoder Court
clearly followed the strict scrutiny standard articulated almost ten years
earlier in Sherbert v. Verner.17 There is little doubt that, by extending
Sherbert to create a religious-based exemption to a criminal law, the Yoder
Court made the free exercise clause a more powerful vehicle for creating
government accommodations of religion than it had ever been.' 8
claims).
13 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
11 Id. at 235-36. In this landmark case, the Amish were excused from sending their children
to secondary school based on their right to the free exercise of religion. Id. The reluctance of
the Court to extend the exemption was evidenced by its efforts to narrow Yoder's holding and
limit its impact. Yet even in taking this large step, the Court stated that "probably few other
religious groups" could similarly succeed. Id. at 236. The Court's insistence that the Amish
presented extraordinary circumstances may have resulted from a fear that less rigorous treatment
would demand "that more difficult accommodations be granted as well." LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 14-7, at 1194 (2d ed. 1988).
15 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 5, § 21.6, at 526 (asserting that Yoder "stands out
as the one instance in which the Court required the government to grant an exemption from a
general regulatory law.. . to persons who could not comply with the law due to their religious
beliefs").
16 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977) (applying strict
scrutiny to minor's right to privacy); see also Jesse H. Chopper, The Free Exercise Clause: A
Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943,
944-45 (1986) (proposing that Yoder illustrates proposition that, under Burger Court, government
had to satisfy "what, essentially, is a test of 'strict scrutiny'").
17 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. In Sherbert, the claimant could not find
employment because her faith prohibited her from working on Saturday. 374 U.S. at 399. The
Court held that "South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the [unemployment compensation]
eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting
the day of rest." Id. at 410. The Court reasoned:
We must ... consider whether some compelling state interest ... justifies the
substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right. It is basic that no
showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice;
in this highly sensitive constitutional area, "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."
Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
i8 TRIBE, supra note 14, § 14-13, at 1255. Religious exemptions are rare and are particularly
difficult because accommodating a religion creates a fear of preference which is prohibited by the
counterpart of the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21.
"The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception from a general obligation of citizenship
on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establishment Clause . . . ." Id.
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Strict scrutiny remained the test for free exercise exemptions until
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith 9 in
1990. In Smith, the so-called "peyote case," five Justices' held that a
state is not required to show a compelling state interest when the statute at
issue is a law of general applicability.2" A state criminal law proscribing
the use of peyote for all citizens was a law of general applicability and,
therefore, required only that the state show a rational basis for the
prohibition when challenged under the First Amendment. This lesser
The Establishment Clause counteracts the Free Exercise Clause by subjecting statutes to the
following test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .; finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1970) (citations omitted). The tension between the two religion clauses
demands the Supreme Court's careful navigation in this area of law. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221
(citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970)). In Walz, the Court stated: "[W]e have
been able to chart a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while
avoiding any semblance of established religion. This is a 'tight rope' and one we have
successfully traversed." Walz, 397 U.S. at 672. See generally Jesse H. Choper, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PiTT. L. REV. 673, 675 (1980)
(asserting that Court's view that religious purpose alone renders government action violative of
Establishment Clause creates conflict between religion clauses). The author also suggests that the
conflict would be ameliorated by requiring that government action be undertaken for religious
purpose. Id. In order to violate the Establishment Clause, the government action must result in
"coercing, compromising or influencing religious beliefs." Id.
But see Comment, A Non-Conflict Approach to the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 131
U. PA. L. REV. 1175, 1177-79 (1983) (arguing that conflict between two clauses is illusory
because they are in relationship of logical priority: free exercise determination reveals purpose
and effect of law, which is necessary for performing mandated Establishment Clause test).
For the purposes of this Note it is unnecessary to untangle the complex and unsettled general
issues of Establishment Clause jurisprudence demonstrated by the Supreme Court's recent frac-
tured decision in Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). It is important, however,
to note that Indian-only legislation is permitted because of the federal trust relationship. See infra
notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing trust relationship). It is because of this anomaly
that non-Indian claimants must rely on free exercise claims instead of the Establishment Clause.
See infra Part III (explaining futility of Establishment and Equal Protection Clause claims).
19 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, an Indian and a non-Indian member of the Native
American Church, a peyotist religious group, were fired by a drug rehabilitation organization for
violating an Oregon law which prohibited the use of peyote. Id. at 874. Since the dismissal was
for work-related "misconduct," unemployment benefits were denied. Id. The Supreme Court
denied claimants' assertion that the Oregon law had unconstitutionally infringed upon their right
to the free exercise of religion. Id. at 890. The Court held that a law of general applicability is
not subject to a strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 884-85. The criminal statute was deemed such a
law. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
o Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy. Id. at 873.
21 Id. at 881-82.
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standard was easily met by the state,' thus assuring that few claims would
survive.
In response to the restrictions on free exercise imposed by the Smith
decision,' as well as to the concern expressed by some members of the
Court,24 Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
" See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. Justice Scalia distinguished the Court's prior cases which had
applied strict scrutiny by categorizing them as "hybrids." Id. at 881-82. These hybrids involved
a free exercise claim in conjunction with another fundamental right. Id. at 881. The Court
provided examples, including Yoder, which involved the right to the free exercise of religion and
the parents' right to raise their children as they see fit. Id. The Court concluded that the claimants
had presented "a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or parental
right." Id. at 882. Therefore, precedent did not demand the application of strict scrutiny. Smith,
494 U.S. at 885.
.3 One commentator reports that supporters of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act moved
as quickly as possible because between 50 and 60 claimants felt the tremendous impact of the
Smith rule; their free exercise claims had been dismissed. See Wendy S. Whitbeck, Restoring
Rites and Rejecting Wrongs: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
821, 867 (1994).
The Smith decision was quickly criticized by many scholars. See, e.g., James D. Gordon
III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 91-102 (1991) (claiming, in Socratic
dialogue, that Court rested its decision on contrived analyses and considerations of policy
independent of Free Exercise Clause's heritage); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1114-28 (1990) (illustrating
Court's failings in textual, historical, and precedential interpretation and advocating return to
Madisonian formula of religious freedom so long as others are not injured); Harry F. Tepker, Jr.,
Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 11-26 (1991)
(questioning Justice Scalia's manipulation of precedent and reliance on overruled doctrine); see
also Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection ofReligiousLibeny,
70 NEB. L. REV. 651, 670-80 (1991) (agreeing with Smith decision, but sharply criticizing
Court's reasoning).
4 Several Justices' concerns regarding the decided break with traditional free exercise
jurisprudence and the majority's failure to follow precedent were patent. Justice O'Connor,
concurring in the result, sharply disagreed with Justice Scalia's analysis. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891
(Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring without joining in judgment). She argued that
the claim could have been dismissed under strict scrutiny rubric, id. at 903-07, and termed the
majority's decision unnecessary, id. at 903. Arguing to preserve strict scrutiny, she noted that
in each case cited by the majority the Court had rejected the claim "only after carefully weighing
the competing interests." Id. at 896. Therefore, she insisted that "rlecent cases have instead
affirmed [strict scrutiny] as a fundamental part of... First Amendment doctrine." Id. at 900.
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, echoed the sentiment of the concurrence, agreeing with Justice
O'Connor's analysis of the free exercise doctrine but disagreeing with the result. Smith, 494 U.S.
at 909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.).
The same concern resurfaced in a recent free exercise decision, Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). According to the Court, the city of
Hialeah, Florida had promulgated laws designed specifically to prohibit the animal sacrifices of
the Santeria religion. Id. at 2228. The laws were struck down because of their constitutionally
repugnant motive, id. at 2231, and their failure to withstand the strict scrutiny analysis, id. at
2233-34. The majority initially distinguished Smith since the law at issue was not determined to
be one of general application. Id. at 2227.
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("RFRA"). 5  In restoring the strict scrutiny test for religious claims,
RFRA appears to have reestablished the strength of religious freedom claims.-6
The majority opinion's reference to the Smith case in dictum compelled Justice Souter,
Lukumi Babalu, 113 S. Ct. at 2240-52, as well as Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, id. at 2250,
to author concurring opinions. The preamble to Justice Souter's opinion demonstrated the delicate
ground upon which the Court was treading:
The Court today refers to [the Smith] rule in dicta, and despite my general agreement
with the Court's opinion I do not join [the part] where the dicta appear, for I have
doubts about whether the Smith rule merits adherence. I write separately to explain
why the Smith rule is not germane to this case and to express my view that, in a case
presenting the issue, the Court should re-examine the rule Smith declared.
Id. at 2240. Later in his opinion, Justice Souter reexamined the rule and found it untenable,
asserting that adherence to the hybrid claim exception would become "so vast as to swallow the
Smith rule." Id. at 2244-45. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, confirmed the
position he took three years earlier when he authored the dissent in Smith, stating, "I continue
to believe that Smith was wrongly decided . . . ." Id. at 2250.
An interesting aside is whether the above opinions represent a retreat from, or reaffirmation
of, the Court's reverence of stare decisis. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2808 (1992) (discussing obligation to follow precedent and pragmatic considerations that influence
judgment of Court when reexamining prior decisions). It seems that the Justices were
uncharacteristically eager either to overturn Smith or to affirm the pre-Smith standard, which
Justice Blackmun "thought. . . was a settled and inviolate principle of this Court's First Amend-
ment jurisprudence." Smith, 494 U.S. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Souterbroached
this issue in his concurrence in Lukumi Babalu, 113 S. Ct. at 2247-49 (Souter, J., concurring).
He maintained that overruling Smith would not be a grave defeat for stare decisis because the rule
was created sua sponte, id. at 2247, and was not necessary to resolve the dispute. Id.; see supra
(discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion).
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1994). The passage of RFRA affirms the congressional view
that "[i]t is not feasible to combat the burdens of generally applicable laws on religion by relying
upon the political process." H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), available at 1993
WL 158058, at *10 (Leg. Hist.). Butsee Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (canvassing Justice Scalia's view
that political process rather than judiciary should be grantor of exemptions); infra note 44
(discussing Justice Scalia's rationale in Smith).
A specific purpose of RFRA is "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in...
[Sherbert and Yoder] and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion
is substantially burdened." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). The compelling interest test was statutorily
defined as follows:
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
Id. § 2000bb-l(b). See generally Whitbeck, supra note 23, at 844-63 (providing exhaustive
discussion of passage of RFRA).
I As the Ninth Circuit noted: "The effects of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act are
widespread." United States v. Bauer, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1458, at *19 (9th Cir. Feb. 2,
1996). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has added that the Act "legislatively overturned a number
of recent Supreme Court decisions. . . by defining a statutory (if not constitutional) right to the
free exercise of religion." Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1479 (10th Cir. 1995).
An example of RFRA's strength was the Ninth Circuit's recent holding that religious
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H. NATIVE AMERICAN FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTIONS
Before reviewing the free exercise claims of non-Indians, it is
important to discuss the religious exemptions offered to Indians themselves.
The federal government has a unique relationship with the Indians.
Through the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall, the Indians essentially
freedom could be used by a Rastafarian as a defense to a charge of criminal possession of
marijuana. Bauer, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS at * 21-22. Although this holding could cynically be
construed as "opening the floodgates" to religious freedom defenses for all drug-related crimes,
the court noted that the application of strict scrutiny does not preclude a finding that the
"universal enforcement" of marijuana laws (including criminal possession) is the least restrictive
means of preventing the sale and distribution of marijuana, which is not a religious activity. Id.
at *22.
Despite its passage, some courts and commentators argue that RFRA was not a valid
exercise of legislative authority. See, e.g., Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355, 357-58
(D. Tex. 1995) (holding RFRA is unconstitutional use of Congressional authority), rev'd, No.
95-50306, 1996 WL 23205 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996). Opponents of RFRA view the legislation
as overruling an interpretation of the Constitution, see Whitbeck, supra note 23, at 865, which
would seem to violate the well-settled principle that the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of
constitutional law. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
Proponents of RFRA believe that the express grant of power to Congress arises from two
sources: Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause. See
Belgard v. Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510, 517 (D. Haw. 1995) (holding that RFRA was within ambit
of Congressional authority); H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), available in 1993
WL 158058 (Leg. Hist.); Whitbeck, supra note 23, at 866 ("The drafters of the RFRA believe
that this Congressional authority to enact a law providing more protection to a constitutional right
arises out of two sources: section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Necessary and Proper
Clause."); Michelle L. Stuart, Note, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993: Restoring
Religious Freedom After the Destruction of the Free Exercise Clause, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV.
383, 416-23 (1994) (arguing that passage of Act was valid exercise of congressional authority);
cf. S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., lst Sess, 13-14 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1903
(asserting Congress has constitutional authority to enact RFRA under section 5 of Fourteenth
Amendment and not relying on Necessary and Proper Clause, stating "Section 5 gives Congress
'the same broad powers expressed in the necessary and proper clause' with respect to State
governments and their subdivisions" (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966)).
Although these powers are limited, the legislature believed that RFRA validly provides greater
rights than those granted by the Constitution. H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
The limits of congressional power in this area are set forth by the legislature: "Congress may not
(1) create a statutory right prohibited by some other provision of the Constitution, (2) remove
rights granted by the Constitution, or (3) create a right inconsistent with an objective of a
constitutional provision." Id. (citing Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); City of Rome
v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)).
Despite this minor controversy, RFRA has received wide acceptance as the new standard
for religious freedom claims. See, e.g., Bass v. Grottoli, No. 94 Civ. 3220, 1995 WL 565979
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1995); Francis v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States
v. Jim, 888 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Or. 1995).
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became wards of the federal government.2 7 This unique "trust relation-
ship" appears to be the foundation of all Native American legal theory.
While this approach historically served to justify improprieties cast upon
the indigenous people of America,' it has in essence permitted the federal
government to treat Native Americans uniquely, whether the results are
burdensome or beneficial.2 9
IE.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). "Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." Id. at 17 (labeling Indian tribes as "domestic
dependent nation" in order to deny Indians right to directly petition Supreme Court for relief as
foreign nations). As a guardian, the federal government enjoys plenary power over the Indians.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (holding that states do not have power to
extend laws to Indian tribes).
The most candid description of the Supreme Court's view of Indians appeared in United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (holding that Congress' plenary power over Indians
includes power to impose criminal liability for inter-Indian murder). The Court stated:
Indian tribes are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for
their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the
States, and receive from them no protection. . . From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with
them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection,
and with it the power.
Id. at 383-84. Although the wardship seems to have been constructed to support the holding of
Cherokee Nation, it has prevailed far beyond its initial purpose. See generally 42 C.J.S. Indians
§ 24 (1991) (compiling case law recognizing unique status of Indian tribes as domestic dependent
nations).
, E.g., Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (denying Indian tribes right to appeal to
Supreme Court as foreign nations); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (denying
Indians fee simple absolute to their lands).
29 See infra notes 30-41 and accompanying text (discussing specific religious exemptions
granted to Native Americans); see also infra notes 51-56 (discussing Supreme Court decision
which validated patent religious and racial discrimination favoring Indians).
The unique status of Native Americans has also produced deleterious effects. See Antelope
v. United States, 430 U.S. 641 (1977). In Antelope, three Indians, enrolled in a tribe, murdered
a non-Indian after breaking into the victim's home on a reservation. Id. at 642. The perpetrators
were subject to federal jurisdiction pursuant to the Major Crimes Act which gives the United
States exclusive jurisdiction over any Indian who commits any crime specified within the statute
against the person or property of any Indian or other person. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988). Two of
the three Indians were convicted of first-degree murder under the federal felony murder statute.
Antelope, 430 U.S. at 642-43. If a non-Indian had committed the same crime, however. Idaho
state law-which does not have a felony murder provision- would have applied. Further.
conviction under the state law would have been more difficult because the Idaho law required
proof of premeditation and deliberation while the federal law did not. Id. at 644. Consequently,
the two respondents in Antelope argued that the application of the felony murder provision was
a violation of equal protection. Id. The Ninth Circuit agreed, but the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "[t]he Federal Government treated respondents in the same manner as all other
persons within federal jurisdiction, pursuant to a regulatory scheme that did not erect
impermissible racial classifications." Id. at 649-50. The Court relied on the principles set forth
in Mancari, see infra notes 51-55, and permitted the unequal treatment. Antelope, 430 U.S. at
645-50.
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This trust relationship manifests itself in the government's willingness
to accommodate the free exercise of Indian religions through statutory
exemption. For example, it is undisputed that eagle feathers play an
important role in the ceremonies of some Indian religions.30 Consequent-
ly, in 1962, the Bald Eagle Protection Act ("BEPA"), 31 which proscribes
the taking of bald eagles,32 was amended 3 to create an exemption for
"the religious purposes of Indian tribes."' The language of the exemp-
tion exhibits discrimination against non-Indians, as well as a prima facie
preference for Indian religions. This discrimination is further evidenced
by the regulatory requirements established for the procurement of feathers
which, for example, require an applicant to prove his or her status as a
tribal member.3
I See United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1303 (D.N.M. 1986) (noting that "[t]he
eagle is the primary messenger to the spirit world and the ceremonial use of its feathers permits
the living to communicate with the spirit world beyond"). Id.
3' 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1988).
31 Id. In July of 1994, the American bald eagle was removed from the Endangered Species
List and reclassified as "threatened." See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1988); see also Catherine O'Neill,
The BaldEagle Soars Back, WASH. PoST, Aug. 2. 1994, at Z18 (noting that -[t]his doesn't mean
that bald eagles no longer need protection"). Therefore, BEPA remains and the amendment stands
as an example of Indian-only statutory accommodation.
16 U.S.C. § 668a (1988).
34 Id. The amendment can be traced to a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior
expressing concern about the ramifications of extending the ban on takings to golden eagles. The
letter stated, in pertinent part, that "[t]he golden eagle is important in enabling many Indian tribes
... to continue ancient customs and ceremonies that are of deep religious or emotional
significance to them." United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 741 (1986). In Dion, the Supreme
Court held that BEPA abrogated the treaty rights of the Yankton Sioux Tribe to hunt eagles on
their reservation. Id. The Dion Court did not hear the free exercise claim. The ability of Indians
to procure feathers may have precluded a finding that religious rights were burdened by the
regulation. See infra note 35 (discussing process of acquiring feathers).
35 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (1994). The regulation states as follows: "The Director may, upon
receipt of an application and in accordance with the issuance criteria of this section, issue a
permit authorizing the taking, possession, and transportation of bald or golden eagles, or their
parts, nests, or eggs for the religious use of Indians." Id.
Indians must petition the United States Fish and Wildlife Service for a permit to possess
eagle parts. Id. § 22.22(a). Petitioners must furnish, among other things, the name of their tribe,
the name of the religious ceremony, and certification from the Bureau of Indian Affairs attesting
that the applicant is an Indian. Id. The Fish and Wildlife Service created depositories to supply
the parts for Indian ceremonial use. See United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1303
(D.N.M. 1986). The parts are collected from eagles which died naturally or were killed acci-
dentally. Id. The Fish and Wildlife Service continues to open new facilities to store eagle parts
for religious use. See Mike Patty, Eagle Feather Repository to Open- Confiscated Wildlife Items
Also Will Be on Display at Facility Planned at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, ROCKY MT. NEwS, Dec.
22, 1994, at 42A.
The permit process might have been affected by the proposed Native American Cultural
Protection and Free Exercise of Religion Act of 1994. S. REP. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
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An example of a religious accommodation which has proven even
more controversial is the permitted sacramental use of peyote, a mind-
altering drug. Many Indian tribes subscribe to the belief that peyote, a
vegetable-like substance which grows on certain cacti, is sacred. 6 In
1965, the Commissioner of Food and Drugs enacted the predecessor to the
current federal regulation that accommodates peyote use in religious
ceremonies only for members of the Native American Church ("NAC").37
(1994), available in 1994 WL 562260, at *22 (Leg. Hist.). Title III of this proposed legislation
related to the religious use of eagles. Within one year of the enactment, the Director of the Fish
and Wildlife Service would have been forced to restructure the procurement process to (1) ensure
prompt disbursement; (2) ensure adequate supply; (3) simplify the process; and (4) provide a
mechanism to allow Indians to use dead eagles which are found on reservations. Id. This
proposed legislation would not have reached non-Indian practitioners. This proposal legislation
was never acted upon.
36 Since time immemorial, Indians have experienced the hallucinogenic effects of this drug
in their religious ceremonies. See, e.g., People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964) (providing
detailed description of peyotist beliefs). Forworshippers, peyote transcends most typical symbolic
sacraments in Judeo-Christian doctrine. United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1342
(D.N.M. 1991) ("Individual freedom, whether it be freedom of religion, expression or
association, has been particularly important to maintaining the culturally diverse character of New
Mexico. Here, we celebrate the right of the individual to revel in the passions of the spirit."). See
generally OMER C. STEWARD, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY (1987) (providing in-depth analysis
of peyotist history and beliefs); EDWARD F. ANDERSON, PEYOTE, THE DIVINE CACTUS (1980)
(discussing history and use of peyote). A Catholic analogy to the use of peyote would be the
transubstantiation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ during Mass because
"[p]eyote itself is considered a deity." Id. As the current President of the Native American
Church, Frank Dayish, Jr., stated: "tilt's the essence of the church ... [w]ithout the sacrament,
there is no church." For Indian Church, A Critical Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at
A10.
37 The current regulation provides as follows:
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the
nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religiots [sic] ceremonies of the Native American
Church, and members of the Native American Church so using peyote are exempt from
registration. Any person who manufactures peyote for or distributes peyote to the
Native American Church, however, is required to obtain registration annually and to
comply with all other requirements of law.
21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1995); see also infra note 41 (discussing intention of Congress that Federal
regulations do not abridge Indians' free exercise of religion). The Attorney General was also
authorized to enact additional rules to regulate the use of peyote. 21 U.S.C. § 821 (1994).
Like the eagle feather exemption, the peyote exemption grew out of an awareness of the
bona fide use of peyote in Indian rituals. See 111 CONG. REC. 15,977 (1965). In creating the
regulatory peyote exemption, Senator Harris noted that "[s]ome concern has been expressed...
by the religious groups affected, and by certain civil liberties organizations concerning the
possible impact [of the Controlled Substance Act of 1970] on religious practices protected by the
first amendment [sic] to the Constitution." Id. The Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce cited a letter written by then-Commissioner of Food and Drugs, George Larrick,
which stated: "We have been advised by a representative of the North [sic] American Church that
this church is a bona fide religious organization and that peyote has bona fide use in the
sacrament of the church." Id. at 15,978.
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Today, many states provide a more evenhanded exemption, accommodating
the use of peyote in the ceremonies of all bona fide religions.38 Oregon's
failure to provide such an exemption gave rise to the Smith case and
consequently propelled the issue of the free exercise of religion to the
forefront of legal inquiry.
In 1978, Congress found that many laws had an adverse impact upon
the religious practices of Indians.39 Therefore, Congress codified a policy
of Indian religious awareness in the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act ("AIRFA"). 40 The Act's purpose was to reaffirm the free exercise
rights of Native Americans and to mandate that Congress consider the
impact of its laws upon the religious practices of Indians.4'
A mere policy statement,42 AIRFA did not present an obstacle for the
Supreme Court in Smith to intimate that states were not required to create
peyote exemptions to accommodate Indian religions. In the fall of 1994,
however, Congress enacted the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
Amendments ("AIRFA Amendments").43 Whereas RFRA was intended
3 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3402 (1989) ("In a prosecution for violation of
this section, [for knowingly possessing, selling, transferring or offering to sell or transfer peyote]
it is a defense that the peyote is being used or is intended for use ... [in connection with the
bona fide practice of a religious belief.. . ."); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-22-317(3) (West
1991 & Supp. 1995) ("The provisions... do not apply to peyote if said controlled substance
is used in religious ceremonies of any bona fide religious organization."); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-31-6(D) (Michie 1989) (providing exemption for "the use of peyote in bona fide religious
ceremonies by a bona fide religious organization").
11 H.R. REP. NO. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1262, 1263.
40 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125-27 (1994).
The text of the statute provides:
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American
Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional
religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but
not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to
worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.
Id.
4' H.R. REP. No. 1308, supra note 39, at 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1262. The
statute's purpose is "to insure that the policies and procedures of various Federal agencies, as
they may impact upon the exercise of traditional Indian religious practices, are brought into com-
pliance with the constitutional injunction that Congress shall make no laws abridging the free
exercise of religion." Id.
12 The Act contained no cause of action for aggrieved Indians. See Lockhart v. Kenops, 927
F.2d 1028, 1036 (8th Cir.) (holding that AIRFA confers no cause of action), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 863 (1991). Moreover, it granted no more rights than those accorded to each citizen by the
First Amendment. See Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 793 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d
856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Attakai v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1395,
1405 (D. Ariz. 1990).
11 See AIRFA Amendments, supra note 9, at 3125-27 (providing statute in part).
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to overrule the judicial standard explicitly espoused in Smith, one purpose
of the AIRFA Amendments was to overrule that case's implicit holding that
the religious use of peyote by Indians could be constitutionally pro-
scribed.' The AIRFA Amendments expanded the prior regulatory scheme
by accommodating the use of peyote by an Indian in "connection with the
practice of a traditional Indian religion."a' Congress intended the AIRFA
Amendments to be applied to all Indians, not just to members of the NAC,
in order to save the cost and time of unnecessary litigation as well as to
prevent unequal protection among individual Indians and tribes.46
Consequently, both pieces of legislation properly foster Indian religious
freedom, but each fails to account for similarly situated bona fide non-
Indian practitioners.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CLAIMS
The Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses generally serve as the
constitutional authority to prevent preference or discrimination based on
religion47 or race" and to mandate neutrality in the law.49 When non-
44 Id. In Smith, Justice Scalia noted that leaving this process to the legislature might be unfair
to minority groups "but that [this] unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs." Employment Div.,
Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). The AIRFA Amendments
appear to embody that sentiment.
41 AIRFA Amendments, supra note 9, at 3125.
46 H.R. REP. No. 675, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2404,
2411 ("[IThe granting of a statutory religious exemption for the sacramental use of peyote solely
by American Indians presents no equal protection or establishment clause problems, and therefore
stands on a solid constitutional footing.") (emphasis added). Indians that are not members of the
Native American Church were previously denied the right to use peyote. See infra note 72 and
accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (striking down exemption created only
for religions which received more than half their contributions from a specific source). "The
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another." Id. at 244. The Supreme Court has proclaimed that the history
of the nation reveals the necessity of the neutral treatment of different religious denominations.
Id. at 246. Moreover, the doctrine of Free Exercise can only be effectuated by granting each
religion equal liberty regardless of size or popularity. Id. at 245.
The Court seemed to provide a laundry list of acts prohibited by the Establishment Clause
in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) stating:
The [Establishment Clause] means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion ...
over another. . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
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Indians seek the religious freedom enjoyed by Indians pursuant to a
statutory exemption, these clauses typically provide the foundation for their
claims.
Non-Indians who wish to gain the same free exercise rights currently
enjoyed by Indians should not base their claims on an equal protection
argument.'0 The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Morton v. Man-
car5 ' seems to ensure that these claims will fail. 2 In Mancari, the
Court held that a stated preference for promoting Indians over non-Indians
within the Bureau of Indian Affairs was valid because Indians constitute a
political rather than a racial class.53  Therefore, instead of requiring
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Id.
The Establishment Clause continues to play an active role on the Supreme Court's docket.
See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (holding that state may not delegate
authority to religious enclave incorporated as village in New York State).
s See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("[The Constitution ... forbids...
discrimination by the General Government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his
race." (citing Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896)); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (rejecting establishment of racially "separate but equal" accommodations
in education).
11 With regard to religion, "[t]he Supreme Court has referred to 'the established principle that
the Government must pursue a course of complete neutrality towards religion.'" TRIBE, supra
note 14, at 1188 (citations omitted). Similarly, with regard to race, "[t]he moral imperative of
racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause." City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The two clauses have been tied together numerous times, most
notably by Justice Harlan when addressing an Establishment Clause claim. In often quoted
language, he stated: "Neutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis."
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
s See infra notes 54-83 and accompanying text.
s' 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
The infamous Mancari case arose when two non-Indians sought a promotion within the
Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"). Id. at 538-39. The BIA was statutorily required to promote
Indians over non-Indians. Id. at 538. The non-Indians argued that the preference must be subject
to strict scrutiny because it discriminated based upon race, and was, therefore, a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 551.
11 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553-54. The Court reasoned that the preference was established for
members of federally recognized tribes and not all persons of Indian descent. Id. at 553 n.24.
Presumably, this characterization excludes many racially eligible Indians and results in a more
politically oriented classification. Id. at 553 n.24; cf. David C. Williams, The Borders of the
Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REv. 759, 762 (1991) (arguing that
Equal Protection Clause should not fully apply to recognized Indians because Fourteenth
Amendment does not extend over semi-sovereign tribes).
Non-Indians have continually been denied special rights of Indians in areas outside of Free
Exercise jurisprudence. See, e.g., Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979) (relying on Mancari to hold that denying non-Indians ability to sell
goods in specific area was not violative of equal protection).
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"strict scrutiny," Indian-only legislation merely requires the law to be "tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the
Indians."54 This test is easily met." Apparently, therefore, traditional
equal protection analysis does not apply to Indians. 6
For example, many non-Indians involved in bona fide religions
requiring the sacramental use of peyote have brought claims seeking the
same protection enjoyed by the NAC.Y The weight of authority,
however, mandates that the Mancari principle be applied, making inevitable
dismissal of non-Indians' equal protection claims. 8
I Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555.
55 Id.
I But see Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960 (7th Cir. 1988). In Reed, a Rastafarian prison
inmate violated a prison rule by growing his hair long. Id. at 961. The inmate brought an equal
protection claim against prison officials based on the fact that the district court had granted an
Indian the right to keep his hair long. Id. at 964. Since the Indian inmate's case was not reported,
the court remanded for further consideration. Id. No further opinion was reported; however, the
court stated that "the defendants are treating the Rastafarians differently from American Indians
(and doing so deliberately) for no reason at all; and if so this is a denial of equal protection of
the laws in an elementary sense." Id. at 964. For a discussion of Rastafarians and their free
exercise rights, see Timothy B. Taylor, Note, Soul Rebels: The Rastafarians and the Free
Exercise Clause, 72 GEO. L.J. 1605 (1984).
17 But cf. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1995) ("The listing of peyote as a controlled substance...
does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religiots [sic] ceremonies of the Native
American Church.. .. "). Post-AIRFA Amendment judicial analysis should not differ from the
pre-AIRFA Amendment analysis because non-Indians are still excluded.
58 See United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595, 601 (D.N.D. 1984) (denying exemption
to non-Indian peyotists claiming membership in Native American Church because "preference
given to Indians in the application of 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 is tied rationally to the fulfillment of
the government's unique obligation toward the Indians and does not violate Defendants' rights
to equal protection"). In Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1215
(5th Cir. 1991), the court considered "whether NAC membership presupposes tribal affiliation
and Native American ancestry, and thus effects a political classification under Morton [v.
Mancari]." The court held that NAC membership did constitute a political classification and,
pursuant to Mancari, the NAC exemption is "rationally related to the legitimate governmental
objective of preserving Native American culture." Id. at 1216; see also Peyote Way Church of
God, Inc. v. Smith, 556 F. Supp. 632, 638 (N.D. Tex. 1983) .(noting that preference given to
Indian members of NAC is political, not racial). But see Native American Church v. United
States, 468 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980). In Native
American Church, the Second Circuit successfully circumvented equal protection analysis by
broadly interpreting the regulatory exemption to include all bona fide religions employing the
sacramental use of peyote. Id. at 1251. The court reasoned that the statutory exemption was
narrowly drafted because the Native American Church, at the time of the drafting, was the only
bona fide peyotist religion known to Congress. Id. The Second Circuit's reading appears to be
constitutionally sound. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961)
("Federal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality.");
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) ("When the validity of an act of the Congress is
drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible
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The AIRFA Amendments solved the equal protection problem for
Indians who were not NAC members by expanding the potential reach of
the federal exemption to all Indian tribe members.59 A curious situation
arose, however, in United States v. Boyll,W when a non-Indian NAC
member asserted an equal protection claim.6" In upholding the claim, the
District Court of New Mexico was spared from applying Mancari by
simply including a non-Indian within the plain meaning of the phrase
"members of the Native American Church."62 Although it did not touch
by which the question may be avoided."). Nevertheless, no court has chosen to follow its
interpretation.
Cf. Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1115 (1973). In Kennedy, the Church of the Awakening, its president, and
four church members sought to include their church within the NAC exemption. They argued that
the failure to exempt their church constituted a due process violation because the regulation
created an arbitrary classification between NAC members who used peyote in bona fide religious
ceremonies and members of the Church of the Awakening who similarly used the substance. 1d.
at 416. After noting that the only legitimate governmental interest involved in regulating peyote
was the protection of the health of citizens, the Court concluded that the exemption created an
arbitrary distinction, and thereby could not withstand a substantive due process attack. Id. at 417.
The modification sought by the Church of the Awakening, however, was denied on the ground
that "it suffer[ed] the same constitutional infirmity as the present regulation." Id.
59 The Equal Protection problem between and among the Indians was mentioned in dicta in
Thornburgh, 922 F.2d at 1216 n.4:
The [non-Indian] federal defendant explains that section 1307.31 exempts only NAC
members because that is the only bona fide tribal Native American peyotist religion of
which the government is aware. While this explanation satisfies us as to the exception's
rationality, we note that another bona fide tribal Native American peyotist organization
may well have a valid equal protection claim based on the federal NAC exemption.
Peyote Way [,a predominantly non-Indian organization,]... is not the proper plaintiff
to raise this claim.
Id. For a discussion of the facts of this case, see infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
Prior to the passage of the AIRFA Amendments, there were instances where Indians were
denied the right to use peyote because of the races of other church members. See id. at 1212
(rejecting claim of non-Indian church which had Indian members); Native American Church, 468
F. Supp. at 1248 (rejecting claim of church while noting that some church members were Native
American). This seems to contradict legislative findings on the enactment of the statute. See
AIRFA Amendments, Pub. L. No. 103-344, § 2, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994) ("[S]ince 1965, this
ceremonial use of peyote by Indians has been protected by Federal regulation.. . . ") (providint
section 3 of AIRFA).
6 774 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991), appeal dismissed, 968 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1992).
6' Robert Boyll was indicted by a federal grand jury for unlawfully importing peyote with the
intent to distribute. Id. at 1335. He had mailed himself a package containing peyote from Mexico
to his residence in New Mexico. Id. He argued, inter alia, that he was exempt from the federal
criminal law since he was a member of the Native American Church per the regulatory exemp-
tion. Id.; see supra note 37 (providing exemption).
I Boyll, 774 F. Supp. at 1338. "The language of 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 is clear, unambiguous
and wholly consistent with the regulation's history and purpose." Id.; see supra note 37 (pro-
viding clear language of regulation). Further, the court logically noted that the exclusion of non-
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upon the equal protection analysis, Boyll provides an important instance
under current federal regulations where a court extended the peyote
exemption to a non-Indian. Moreover, the court implicitly construed the
regulation as a church-based exemption, focusing on whether the claimant
was a member of the NAC rather than exclusively reserving the exemption
for Indians. The obvious inference is that, as construed today, the statute
is not founded solely upon the unique responsibility of the federal
government to the Indians. In this light, the accommodation appears to be
as plainly violative of the Constitution as would have been an exemption
which allowed only the Roman Catholic Church to sacramentally use wine
during Prohibition.63
Indians easily could have been added to the statute. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. at 1338. The crafting of
the exemption for the church, as opposed to specifically for Indians, is supported by the
legislative record. A member of the House of Representatives said, "[w]e consider the...
fc]hurch. . .sui generis. The history and tradition of the church is such that there is no question
but that they regard peyote as a diety [sic]." Drug Abuse ControlAmendments of 1970: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1970) [hereinafter Drug Abuse Hearings]
(statement of Mr. Sonnenreich) (emphasis added). The government argued that Boyll could not
be a member of the Native American Church. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. at 1335. The court found the
government's argument unpersuasive, stating: "To exclude individuals of a particular race from
being members of a recognized religious faith is offensive to the very heart of the First
Amendment." Id. at 1340. Membership decisions are internal Church matters "which the First
Amendment shields from governmental interference." Id. The court expanded its analysis,
intimating that a racially restrictive reading of the statute would also offend the doctrine of equal
protection. Id.
But see United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595 (D.N.D. 1984). In Warner, the court
relied on Mancari to justify the regulation's restrictive nature and denied the non-Indians' claim
without ever determining whether the individuals were members of the NAC. Id. at 601. This
analysis also enabled the court to avoid the plain language of the statute. See also Michael E.
Connelly, Comment, New Mexico Federal Court Rejects Government's Attempt to Determine
Membership Eligibility in a Religion: U.S. v. Boyll, 23 N.M. L. REV. 211 (1993). Connolly
argues that the statute should be read to restrict the exemption to Native Americans because the
legislative history does not support the court's "interpretation." Id. at 218-19. Connolly, relying
on broad stereotypical statements made by courts when referring to the peyotist church, further
notes that when the legislation was enacted, virtually all members of the NAC were Indian. Id.
at 213. This attempt to interpret an unambiguous statute by using legislative intent for which there
is no evidence is misguided. As the Boyll Court stated, "[w]hen we find the terms of a statute
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete." 774 F. Supp. at 1338 (quoting Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)). Finally, Connolly argues that the statute was enacted to
preserve the culture of the Native Americans rather than to advance religious freedom. Connelly,
supra, at 218. Such a view, however, appears to be contradicted by the congressional record. See
Drug AbuseHearings, supra (implying exemption was enacted for religious, not cultural reasons).
ICf. Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2497 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor stated that religious exemptions are permissible when
[t]he government is accommodating a deeply held belief. Accommodations may thus
justify treating those who share this belief differently from those who do not; but they
do not justify discriminations based on sect. A state law prohibiting the consumption
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The Mancari roadblock also affects Establishment Clause claims of
non-Indians with respect to statutory religious practice exemptions. For
example, in Rupert v. Director, US. Fish & Wildlife Sericej an
Establishment Clause claim was brought by Erwin Rupert, the pastor of a
non-Indian religious organization which follows the religious customs of
Native Americans and,' accordingly, relies on the ceremonial use of
eagle feathers.' Despite his proper petition to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service ("FWS"), Rupert's self-proclaimed "tribe" was denied access to
the feathers.67 Rupert's Establishment Clause argument was based on the
traditional "neutrality" principle which demands that a religious benefit
cannot be conferred on one group and withheld from another similarly
situated group.6 The First Circuit opined that "'[n]eutrality in its
application requires an equal protection mode of analysis'"69; but, since
"federal regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon impermissible
classifications," only a "rational relationship" analysis is merited.7"
Consequently, Rupert's Establishment Clause claim was subject to the less
stringent analysis applied to the equal protection claim in Mancari.7'
Thus, Mancari seems to offer courts a method of dismissing non-Indian
claims with respect to equal application of religious practice exemptions,
regardless of whether Equal Protection or Establishment Clause principles
are asserted. 72
of alcohol may exempt sacramental wines, but it may not exempt sacramental wine use
by Catholics but not by Jews.
Id.
64 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992).
65 Id. at 33.
65 Id.
I Id. at 33-34. Rupert's application was referred to the Bureau of Indian Affairs which
determined his group not to be a "tribe" because it "did not consist of Native American Indian
descendants who are descended from a specific historical tribe." Id. at 34 (quoting BIA findings).
6 Rupert, 957 F.2d at 34; see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (finding that
exemption which frees one religious group from prohibition but not another violates principle of
neutrality which is at heart of Establishment Clause).
69 Rupert, 957 F.2d at 34 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring)); see also supra note 49 (discussing similar requirement of neutrality).
70 Rupert, 957 F.2d at 35 (quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977)).
"' See supra note 54 and accompanying text. The Rupert Court cited Mancari for the
proposition that "'the peculiar semi-sovereign and constitutionally recognized status of Indians
justifies special treatment on their behalf when rationally related to the Government's unique
obligation toward the Indians.'" Rupert, 957 F.2d at 35 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,673
n.20 (1979)).
7 Aside from utilizing the Mancari rationale as support for their determinations, courts have
demonstrated that the federal trust relationship, see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text, is
sufficient to dismiss a non-Indian's Establishment Clause claim. In Peyote Way Church of God,
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Due to Mancari's stronghold on Equal Protection Clause claims and
its influence on Establishment Clause claims with respect to non-Indians,
judges seem unable to provide non-Indians equal protection unless they
deny Indians their unique legal status. For example, in Peyote Way Church
of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh,3 in which a non-Indian claimant was seeking
to use peyote for religious purposes, the dissent explicitly distinguished and
criticized Mancari.74 The dissent sharply criticized the majority for
transforming a purely religious accommodation into a political one based
on the government's paternalistic relationship to the Indians.75 Further,
it insisted that Mancari should not provide a basis to grant the authority to
enact laws which preferred one specific religion over another and
concluded that the equal protection claim must be subject to heightened
scrutiny.76
Faced with an analogous scenario involving the religious use of
marijuana, the dissent in Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration' was
compelled to act similarly. In Olsen, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, per then-Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, held that
Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991), a predominantly non-Indian church sought
a declaratory judgment that the federal Native American Church exemption was unconstitutional.
Id. at 1212. The Fifth Circuit, foregoing a traditional Establishment Clause test, see supra note
68 and accompanying text, held that the seemingly violative exemption was permitted.
Thornburgh, 922 F.2d at 1217. The court reasoned that the trust relationship "precludes the
degree of separation of church and state ordinarily required by the First Amendment." Id. First,
the court found that the NAC is not "similarly situated" to any other religious organizations due
to the Indians' peculiar status under the law. Id. Second, the court noted that the federal exemp-
tion was based on a political classification. Id. Finally, the court found that the NAC is the only
tribal association the government was aware of that uses peyote in religious ceremonies, and thus
concluded that the exemption is not religiously based but merely protects Indian culture. Id. This
seems to mimic the equal protection rationale of courts. In short, the government's guardian status
has enabled courts to mandate protection of the ward's culture, rendering the preference
constitutional, or, in a sense, a nonconstitutional issue.
Moreover, adhering to a settled Establishment Clause test does not appear to alter the result.
See United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595 (D.N.D. 1984). In Warner, the court applied the
Lemon test. See supra note 18. With regard to 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31, the court found that: (1) it
was secular because its goal was to "meet possible free exercise claims by removing affirmative
barriers to religious practices," Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 599; (2) it did not advance religion,
since "it merely allows the free exercise of the traditional NAC religion" without active
sponsorship, id. at 599-600; and (3) there was no excessive entanglement "given the
government's reliance on the history of the American Indians' religious beliefs ...and the
governmental duty to preserve the Indian culture and religion," id. at 600.
73 922 F.2d at 1220 (Clark, C.J., dissenting); see infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text
(discussing case).
74 Thornburgh, 922 F.2d at 1220.
75 Id.
76 Id.
- 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 906 (1990).
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the NAC-only peyote exemption should not extend to a bona fide religion
which sacramentally used marijuana.7" The dissent first maintained that
the majority's equal protection analysis was incorrect and invoked the
Establishment Clause doctrine that "one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another."" Arguing that Indian status does not
affect religious character, the dissent concluded that the existence of a clear
Indian preference in light of Establishment Clause principles demanded a
strict scrutiny analysis, which the exemption could not withstand."
The dissents in Olsen and Thornburgh could not have reached their
conclusions without circumventing Mancari's broadly applied rule that the
government's paternalistic relationship to the Indians precludes an Equal
Protection or Establishment Clause violation. The Olsen dissent, however,
would have stricken the law and abolished the exemption for everyone,8'
thus rendering the non-Indian claimant's victory pyrrhic.' Therefore, the
most successful Equal Protection or Establishment Clause analysis for non-
Indians seems circular. It leaves them where they began-with no religious
accommodations.'
7s Id. at 1465. Olsen, a member and priest of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, asserted that
using marijuana was a church sacrament and argued unsuccessfully for the accommodation of his
religious practice based on the Native American Church peyote exemption. Id. at 1459.
1 Id. at 1468 (Buckley, J., dissenting) (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244
(1982)).
I d. at 1471-72.
sI Thornburgh, 922 F.2d at 1220-21 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
Id. While the dissent's argument, at first glance, may have appeared to favor non-Indians,
upon closer examination, the dissent's argument actually contemplated invalidating the accom-
modation for any group rather than elevating the non-Indian church to exemption status.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Olsen majority, stated that "credit[ing] Olsen's equal
protection argument or the dissent's portrayal of it in terms of the establishment clause, the
remedy ... [of extending the accommodation] hardly follows." 878 F.2d at 1464. She also
added: "[faced with the choice between invalidation and extension of any controlled-substances
religious exemption, which would the political branches choose? It would take a court bolder
than this one to predict ... that extension, not invalidation, would be the probable choice." Id.
(citing Miller, Constitutional Remedies for Under-Inclusive Statutes: A Critical Appraisal of
Heckler v. Matthews, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (1985); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on JudicialAuthority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301
(1979)).
1 Non-Indian claimants should seek to expand religious tolerance, not thwart it. The Equal
Protection and Establishment Clauses have not aided the non-Indian in his or her battle for equal
treatment under the federally established Indian religion exemptions. In light of both the publicity
garnered by the recent AIRFA Amendments, which served to grant Native Americans increased
religious freedom, and the unique legal status of Indians, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court
will ever strike down a legislative Indian-only religious exemption. Furthermore, non-Indians
would be foolish to seek the revocation of religious freedom for a "political entity" which has
lobbied so extensively for such rights.
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For the above reasons, it is imperative that non-Indians practicing
Indian religions seize upon the restoration of free exercise rights embodied
in RFRA and the AIRFA Amendments to achieve equality with their Indian
brethren.
IV. NON-INDIAN FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS
RFRA mandates a pre-Smith test incorporating the strict scrutiny
standard' as follows: the claimant must show (1) that his or her beliefs are
sincere and (2) that the government action infringes upon these beliefs.
The burden then shifts to the government to show (3) that the law is
essential to serve a compelling interest and (4) that the exemption unduly
hinders the fulfillment of that goal.'
In order to facilitate the discussion of non-Indian free exercise claims,
this section will mirror the four part test to be employed by a court. To
facilitate the examination of the substantive arguments, the first part of this
section will separate the free exercise analysis into two subsections: (A) the
claimant's burden and (B) the government's burden. The second part of
the section will argue the merits of a non-Indian's free exercise claim; first,
for the use of eagle feathers, and, second, for the sacramental use of
peyote.
A. The Claimant's Burden: Sincerity and Infringement
Courts appear to afford the first two parts of the test only minimal
analysis. Hence, the sincerity of a non-Indian claimant's beliefs and the
infringement on his or her rights are often assumed arguendo. Courts
seem to believe that determining the sincerity of a claimant's beliefs can be
a dangerous undertaking.' Nonetheless, there should be an inquiry
8 See supra notes 18, 24 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny standard).
85 TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1242 (synthesizing traditional free exercise scheme). Later in the
discussion, Professor Tribe incorporates the second part of the Sherbert test (i.e. using the least
restrictive means) with the compelling interest prong. Id. at 1256.
1 The decisions are usually based on other grounds. See, e.g., Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 33 (1st Cir. 1992) (assuming genuineness of defendant's faith,
although court's references to religious beliefs in question were sarcastic and mocking); Olsen
v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (assuming claimant's
sincerity and burden although claimants asserted that smoking marijuana all day was essential to
religious practice); United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595, 598 (D.N.D. 1984) (foregoing
discussion of sincerity and burden, despite court observation that plaintiffs had not carried their
burden).
87 Peyotism and the religious use of eagle feathers may seem outlandish, but "one man's
'bizarre cult' is another's true path to salvation." TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1181 (quoting
theologian Harvey Cox). "The perception of the claimant's sincerity inevitably reflects the
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regarding sincerity since it is "an established part of our free exercise
doctrine."88
The assessment of burden is often contingent upon the sincerity of the
individual's beliefs.89 That is, it should be more difficult to successfully
argue that one's religious freedom is infringed upon if the prohibited
activity or belief is not essential to the practice of the religion. Although
lower courts have stated that the burdened belief must be a central tenet of
the religion, 91 the Supreme Court has never so held.9' Simply stated, the
issue of "burden looks to the degree that the government's requirement
factfinder's view of the reasonableness of the claimant's beliefs." Id. at 1245. Indeed, -the very
rights ostensibly protected by the free exercise clause might well be jeopardized by any but the
most minimal inquiry into sincerity." Id. at 1246. For example, Tribe notes one unsuccessful
claim which involved a church seeking a drug exemption whose seal was a three-eyed toad, and
whose motto was "Victory over Horseshit." Id. at 1246 (discussing United States v. Kuch, 288
F. Supp. 439, 445 (D.D.C. 1968)).
1 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 907 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). Sincerity is an issue for the finder of fact. See TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1244
(citing on United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1994)); see also People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d
716, 726 (1964). The Supreme Court of California, inquiring into the sincerity of an Indian
peyotist's beliefs, relied on Ballard and stated:
We do not doubt the capacity of judge and jury to distinguish between those who
would feign faith in an esoteric religion and those who would honestly follow it.
"Suffice it to say that trial courts will have to determine in each instance, with
whatever evidence is at hand, whether or not the assertion of a belief which is
protected by the First Amendment is in fact a spurious claim."
Id. (citations omitted). The court also determined that although judicial scrutiny into the truth of
a religious belief is forbidden by the First Amendment, there must be an inquiry into whether the
individual holds his belief sincerely, in good faith, and not as a pretext for illegal conduct. Id.
It is interesting to note that the court mentioned the Prohibition Act, see supra note 1, as an
example of a situation where the factual determination of sincerity was required. Id. It appears
that the sincerity inquiry for the present Indian-only exemptions begins and ends with indicia such
as tribal membership or church affiliation. For example, the petition for eagle feathers requires
information indicating the "[n]ame of tribe with which applicant is associated." 50 C.F.R.
§ 22.22(a)(3) (1994); see also supra note 35 (discussing requirements of exemptions). The peyote
regulations require one to be a member of the NAC. See supra note 37 (providing federal
exemption for Native American Church). Thus, sincerity concerns seem to have been
incorporated into the statutes. Moreover, the judgments seem to turn on the narrowness of the
exemption, essentially foreclosing the sincerity issue under the guise of assuming the claimant's
truthfulness.
89 TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1246.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1497 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (refusing to
allow Native American to procure panther parts for religious purposes in contravention of Endan-
gered Species Act because claimant had "not adequately shown that the possession of panther
parts is regular and material to an important religious ceremony or ritual"); see also Sequoyah
v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir.) (reviewing cases where practice in
question was found to be central to religious observances), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
9' TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1247. Tribe insists that the showing of a burden is usually
contingent upon the centrality of the belief. Id.
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will, directly or indirectly, make the believer's religious duties more
difficult or more costly."'
B. The Government's Burden: Overcoming Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny requires the government to show that the prohibition on
the activity is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that the
activity would unduly burden the government's legitimate goal.' It seems
that the government must demonstrate a difference or a distinguishing
factor to justify the disparate treatment of Indian and non-Indian bona fide
practitioners of Native American religions. The government, through its
enactments of Indian exemptions, has supplied legitimate reasons for
guaranteeing Indians special rights.9' It is presumed that, absent federal
legislation, each individual currently enjoying a statutory accommodation
would prevail under a strict scrutiny rubric.95 Neither Congress nor the
92 Id.
I See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1462
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 906 (1990).
See supra note 34.
In creating the recent comprehensive peyote exemption for Indians, Congress noted that
if Indians had to forge judicial exemptions it would be burdensome to the courts and the results
could differ between tribes and individuals. H.R. REP. No. 675, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2404, 2410. In passing the AIRFA Amendments the House
commented:
[A]bsent Federal legislation, the question of whether a given State has a compelling
interest to prohibit the religious use of peyote by Indians is one that would necessarily
be determined by the courts on a State-by-State basis. . . . Such piecemeal judicial
resolution to this issue is not likely to produce uniform, just or equal results, and
would be unduly burdensome, costly and time consuming.
Id. Therefore, the presumptions that Indian claims would be successful and that the government
has legitimate reasons for their accommodations provide a sound basis for the extant Indian-only
exemptions. The exemptions would be based on the interests of judicial efficiency and more
importantly, equal protection since equal treatment "is fulfilled by the uniform application of the
'compelling interest' test to all free exercise claims." Smith, 494 U.S. at 918 (Blackmun. J.,
dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
For example, the exemption granted Indians to use eagle feathers by the Bald Eagle
Protection Act resembles a judicial exemption in that competing interests have been balanced. It
is certain that there is a conflict between the government's interest in preserving the symbol of
our nation in the wild and the practice of many tribal ceremonies which require eagle feathers.
Congress introduced and passed an exemption because it was confirmed that Indian tribes used
eagle feathers in bona fide ceremonies. Therefore, the government took steps to advance its goal
of preservation while recognizing the legitimate Indian need for eagle feathers. Since the interest
in preserving eagles could be served other than by a complete ban on the use of their feathers,
the fulfillment of the goal was not unduly burdened. The result was that Indians cannot kill
eagles; rather, they must petition an agency for the use of the parts of deceased eagles. Thus, the
legislation can be directly correlated to the balancing of interests associated with a strict scrutiny
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Court have provided sufficient justification for their failure to extend to
non-Indians this same exemption, particularly in light of the -strong
arguments both make in favor of the Indian accommodation.
C. The Religious Use of Eagle Feathers
Despite permitting Indian religions to use eagle feathers in their
ceremonies,96  the government has denied such permission to non-
Indians. 1 In Rupert v. Director, United States Fish & Wildlife Service,98
a non-Indian brought a claim challenging this result and demanding
neutrality toward religion. 99 The claimant's church, founded on Native
American ideology,"° was denied access to eagle feathers despite the
federal exemption granted Indians.' 0' This denial was based upon a
finding that the church had not satisfied the requirements under federal
regulations for identification as an "Indian tribe."'" The First Circuit
denied the claim based on Equal Protection and Establishment Clause
analysis.° 3 While the court did not discuss free exercise (perhaps because
Rupert did not pursue such a claim) it appears that a free exercise claim,
standard. It appears to have served both party's interests: religious freedom and eagle
preservation.
I See, e.g., United States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. 269, 277 (D. Nev.
1986), aff'd, 829 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing rights of Indians to possess eagle feathers
for religious purposes if procured by permit); United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1304
(D.N.M. 1986) (noting that Indians had right to use eagle feathers in religious rituals); see also
16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1994) (permitting use of eagle feathers for Indian religious purposes); supra
note 35 (discussing 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (1994) and procedure for gaining permission to use eagle
feathers).
I See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
9 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1991).
19 Id. at 34. Rupert agreed that the government could prohibit all uses of bald eagle or golden
eagle feathers, but asserted that once it allowed exceptions, they must be applied evenly. Id.
1o0 Id. at 33. The church was also founded as the "Tribe of the Pahana" which meant "the
tribe of 'returned white brothers and sisters.'" Id.
"I1 Rupert, 957 F.2d at 33; see supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text (discussing Rupert
case).
102 Rupert, 957 F.2d at 33-34. To obtain classification as an "Indian tribe" a group must
show that it "has been identified from historical times until the present on a substantially
continuous basis, as 'American Indian,' or 'aboriginal.'" Id. at 33 (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 83.7).
Since Rupert's organization was comprised of non-Indians, it was unable to provide such proof.
Id. at 34. It is interesting to note that some change in language has taken place in this definition
since the case was decided, but among the numerous requirements, the need to have an historical
connection to an American Indian tribe is still in place. See Procedures for Establishing that an
American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (1995).
103 Rupert, 957 F.2d at 34 (stating that although petitioner's claim was based on Establish-
ment Clause, equal protection analysis was also required). For a discussion of the reasons
Rupert's Equal Protection and Establishment Clause claims failed, see supra notes 67-71 and
accompanying text.
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in light of RFRA, would probably succeed.
Under RFRA, as a starting point, the claimant must prove that a
sincerely held belief was burdened by the government's action.l°4
Since eagle feathers are a necessary part of a religious ceremony,'05 a
prohibition on their procurement clearly constitutes a burden to bona fide
practitioners. Therefore, the focus should be on the sincerity of the belief.
In Rupert, the court did not address the sincerity of Rupert's belief because
it was undisputed."° Therefore, absent extreme factors, it is likely that
a court would find such a claimant's belief to be sincere and burdened.
Thus, the claim would survive the initial test of strict scrutiny analysis.l°7
Accordingly, under RFRA, the burden then shifts to the government
to show both that it had a compelling interest and that the action taken was
narrowly tailored to achieve its goal. Protection and preservation of the
'04 See supra text accompanying notes 86-92; see also William B. Butler, Note, Constitutional
Law-The Free Exercise Clause: The Supreme Court Avoids Strict Scrutiny and the "Compelling
Governmental Interest" Test-Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 595, 602 (1991) (discussing distinction
between direct and indirect burdens on religious practice). But see Michael J. Simpson,
Accommodating Indian Religions: The Proposed 1993 Amendment to the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act, 54 MONT. L. REV. 19, 19 (1993) (addressing cases which held that any
governmental action that creates "incidental" burdens on free exercise of religion need not be
justified by compelling state interest).
105 See United States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. 269, 276 (D. Nev. 1986),
aff'd, 829 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that "any scheme which limits the access of the
faithful to their talisman [eagle feathers] must be seen as having a profound effect on the exercise
of religious belief"); see also United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1303 (D.N.M. 1986)
("The use of [eagle] feathers, particularly from the tail and wings, is indispensable to the
ceremonies . . . ."). See generally Britt Banks, Comment, Birds of a Feather: Cultural Conflict
and the Eagle in American Society, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 639 (1988) (discussing importance of
eagle feathers in Native American religion).
Requiring Rupert's church to use the feathers of another bird is analogous to forcing a
Catholic to use grape juice instead of wine during the Mass. In fact, "experts in comparative
religion have likened the status of the eagle feather in Indian religion to that of the cross in the
Christian faith." See Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. at 276; see also Jack F. Trope,
Protecting Native American Religious Freedom: The Legal, Historical, and Constitutional Basis
for the Proposed Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 373, 384 (1993) (analogizing Native American's use of eagle feathers to use of Christian
cross). See generally Janet L. Dolgin, Religious Symbols and the Establishment of a National
'Religion, '39 MERCER L. REV. 495 (1988) (discussing significance of religious symbols).
101 Rupert, 957 F.2d at 33. It would be difficult to believe that Rupert would undertake the
expense and energy to petition the agency, file a claim, and appeal it to the circuit court if his
beliefs were not sincere. No disingenuous motive can be suggested in this case since, for exam-
ple, the use of an illicit drug is not at issue. Moreover, Rupert did not shoot an eagle which might
have suggested some financial motive because he could then sell the parts to desirous tribes.
11 See supra notes 86-88 (discussing relative ease with which these examinations are
satisfied).
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bald eagle is undeniably an important governmental interest.0" The
complete ban on the use of eagle feathers by non-Indians, however, does
not seem to be the least restrictive means of fulfilling this goal. Expanding
the exemption to include non-Indian bona fide practitioners would be less
restrictive than applying the exemption only to Indians. This is obvious
because, under such a rule, all bona fide practitioners seeking the use of
eagle feathers would be protected.
The harder question is to what extent this less restrictive formulation
will hinder the governmental interest; that is, can the government fulfill its
goal? Extending the exemption to non-Indian practitioners would result
only in an increase in the FWS' feather distribution workload. 1 9
Nowhere in the regulation regarding the current Indian-only exemption is
there a requirement that the FWS meet petitioners' demands; rather, the
FWS merely makes the feathers available, it does not kill eagles."0
Thus, although exempting a non-Indian church might reduce the supply of
feathers, it would allow the members to exercise their religion by procuring
available feathers without sacrificing the goal of eagle preservation.
11 The existence of a compelling interest is assumed for the bald eagle. See Banks, supra
note 105, at 639 (discussing significance of eagles in American society). This may have changed,
however, since the eagle was taken off the Endangered Species List. See Melissa Healy, U.S.
Will Take Bald Eagle Off Endangered List, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1994, at 1A (noting that bird
has rebounded to recovery levels); O'Neill, supra note 32, at Z18 (indicating bald eagle has been
reclassified onto "threatened" list). Removing this status may diminish the interest to something
less than compelling. See Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. at 1307 (holding that free exercise right of
Indians outweighs "commendable" government interest in preserving nonendangered golden
eagle).
'c But see Trope, supra note 105, at 384 (stating that presently, FWS is inadequate to meet
needs of even Native Americans). The procedure for acquiring eagle feathers and parts is
arduous. See United States v. Jim, 888 F. Supp. 1058, 1060 (D. Or. 1995) (detailing application
process). An Indian desiring eagle parts may file a written request with the FWS. Id. If approved,
this permit is passed along to the BIA to verify that the applicant is authorized to collect the parts.
Id. The BIA returns approved applications to the FWS, which then notifies the national eagle
repository in Oregon to fill the request. Id. The repository fills requests on a "first-come, first-
served basis." Id. While the process mostly involves the shuffling of paperwork, it is a lengthy
one. Jim, 888 F. Supp. at 1062. "On average, it takes the repository two weeks to supply most
feathers, six months to one year for parts; and 18 months for carcasses." Id. Much of this delay
results from the scarcity of available parts. Id. at 1064. A national retrieval system was not
established until 1994. Id. Adding to the delay is the fact that an individual may have only one
request pending at a time. Id. at 1062.
"10 The FWS provides parts of dead eagles. See supra note 35. As of 1986, "no application
to kill or otherwise harm a golden eagle [had] ever been granted." Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. at 1303.
Since at that time the golden eagle was not endangered, id. at 1307, it can be assumed that no
petitions to kill the endangered bald eagle were granted. See also Jim, 888 F. Supp. at 1062
("For at least ten years, no one in the Pacific region has requested or received a permit to kill
an eagle.").
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Further, extending the exemption would not expand the duties of the
FWS."' Since the FWS already monitors petitions, and does so very
strictly, thus assuring bona fide use pursuant to the regulations,112 an
expansion of the exclusion to qualified non-Indians would only increase the
paperwork which alone is not a hinderance.
In summary, permitting non-Indians to procure eagle feathers involves
a balancing of interests. For example, if the population of eagles were to
drastically decrease, the free exercise claim might then be outweighed by
the compelling need for an absolute ban in order to preserve the symbol of
our nation. The government, however, is not yet faced with such a
See supra note 109 (discussing duties of FWS).
1 See supra notes 35, 109 and accompanying text (noting rigorous process to procure permit
to use eagle feathers). Also, the regulation provides virtually complete discretion to the Director
of Fish and Wildlife to issue permits to Native Americans. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(c) (1994). It allows
the Director to refuse to grant a permit for eagle feathers if the issuance would not be compatible
with preservation of bald or golden eagles. Id.
Moreover, the FWS certainly should be qualified to discern fraudulent from bona fide
petitions since such an inquiry is presently a necessary part of the existing regulation. See id.
§ 22.22(c)(2). One of the criteria for determining whether to permit the procurement of the
feathers is "[w]hether the applicant is an Indian who is authorized to participate in bonafide tribal
religious ceremonies." Id.
A possible ramification of extending the exemption to non-Indians is that Indians will be
adversely affected by the increased demand, and therefore reduced supply, of eagle feathers. If
non-Indians were permitted to use eagle feathers it is unlikely that Indians would have a free
exercise claim based on the lack of resources. Compare Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. at 1307 (holding
that "labyrinthine" regulations infringed upon Indians' right to free exercise of religion despite
fact that claimant did not petition agency) with United States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, 649
F. Supp. 269, 278 (D. Nev. 1986) (holding that claimant which did not petition for feathers
lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of regulation), aff'd, 829 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1987).
Since the number of non-Indians in need of eagle feathers is small, they are not likely to
substantially affect the supply.
Another concern is that needy groups will forego the petitions and kill their own eagles.
Rupert's choice to petition for the feathers, however, indicates that this may not pose a problem.
But see Jim, 888 F. Supp. at 1062 (explaining that process was not able to supply defendant with
his needs, so he resorted to self-help). However, the criminal sanctions for violations of the Act
should remain an effective means of deterring both Indian and non-Indian self-help. See 16
U.S.C. § 668(b) (1994). Section 668(b), labeled "Enforcement provisions" gives the Department
of the Interior the authority to arrest violators of the EAGLE PROTECTION ACT without a warrant.
Id. The regulation appears to be strongly enforced. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S.
734, 745 (1986) (involving conviction of Indian under BEPA for shooting four bald eagles for
commercial purposes); United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1976) (indicting Indian
for selling items made from eagle parts); Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. at 1302 (involving charges of
possession of eagle parts without permit); Thiny Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. at 271
(involving indictment for illegally selling eagle parts). These concerns about the availability of
eagle parts, however, are merely speculative. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 911 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[The] Court's prior decisions
have not allowed a government to rely on mere speculation about potential harms, but have
demanded evidentiary support for a refusal to allow a religious exception.").
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concern. Therefore, the government can show no compelling interest in
restraining sincere non-Indians from using eagle feathers in bona fide
religious ceremonies, nor can it show that a complete ban for non-Indians
is necessary. Further, as previously noted, the use of eagle feathers by
non-Indians would not unduly hinder the attainment of the government's
goal of preservation.
Consequently, pursuant to the strict scrutiny analysis, Rupert's church
should have been treated on an equal basis with an Indian church and
should have been permitted to procure eagle feathers. In other words,
Rupert's church should have been permitted to freely exercise its religion.
D. The Religious Use of Peyote
The preliminary issue of sincerity presents a more complex problem
when dealing with peyote than with eagle feathers. More specifically, the
use of a mind-altering drug, even for religious purposes, carries the
concern of possible fraud."' The current regulatory exemption for
peyote is based on proof of tribal affiliation or membership in the
NAC; 1 4 unlike a finding of sincerity, these indicia can often be verified
by firm evidence. Nevertheless, courts usually presume sincerity, thus
giving the appearance that they are treating bona fide Indian and non-Indian
practitioners alike." 5  It is submitted that a thorough review of the
W See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
"4 The peyote regulatory exemption requires the applicant to prove membership in the Native
American Church, see supra note 37, and the broader AIRFA Indian exemption, supra note 59,
still requires the individual to be an "Indian." Under the Amendments, "'Indian' means a member
of an Indian tribe." AIRFA Amendments, supra note 9, § 3(c)(1). Moreover, "'Indian tribe'
means any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other organized group or community of Indians,
including any Alaska Native village ... which is recognized as eligible for the special programs
and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians." Id.
§ 3(c)(2). The legislative history of 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 does not support a finding that Congress
intended a broad exemption for religious use of peyote by non-NAC members or non-Indians.
See United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595, 598 (D.N.D. 1984). Thus, the inquiry begins
with proof of membership in a church or recognition of Indian status by the government. It
seems, however, that sincerity should not depend on your blood quantum, nor should it be
achieved by association with a group, If two individuals are similarly situated, they should be
treated equally.
"I See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Courts, however, seem more likely to develop
the sincerity issue when dealing with a member of the Native American Church. See, e.g., United
States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (D.N.M. 1991) (finding non-Indian NAC member's
beliefs sincere), appeal dismissed, 968 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1992); State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d
950, 954 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (finding that non-Indian NAC members were sincere after
reviewing record), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); see also TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1245-46
(arguing that sincerity is not pursued because anything but minimal scrutiny into one's beliefs can
jeopardize religious liberty protected by Constitution); People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813,821 (Cal.
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claimant and the claimant's organization by the regulatory agency can
prevent fraudulent claims.
1964) (stating that courts may only ask whether claimant honestly holds beliefs because First
Amendment forecloses judicial examination of truth or validity of religious beliefs).
The AIRFAAmendments, extending the peyote exemption only to Indians who practice bona
fide Indian religions creates a legal dilemma if bona fide organizations other than the Native
American Church are found to exist. See Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922
F.2d 1210, 1216 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting, in dictum, possible problem that other tribes may
exist); supra note 59. It seems the government believes that only Indians participate in Indian
activities. Yet, the Native American Church proselytizes non-Indians. 774 F. Supp. at 1336 ("The
vast majority of Native American Church congregations, like most conventional congregations,
maintains an 'open door' policy and does not exclude persons on the basis of their race."); see
also Whittingham, 504 P.2d at 951 (explaining that membership to non-Indians is usually not
refused). The court record in Boyll provided that "[n]on-Indians have been and continue to be
full, legitimate members both of the American Church of God [the Taos N.M. branch] and of
other branches of the Native American Church." Boyll, 774 F. Supp. at 1337 n.3 (affidavit of
church member); see also supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing Boyllcase). Since
the AIRFA Amendments carved a state and federal law exemption for Indians, a non-Indian
Native American Church member may now be exempt under federal law but not state law. See
supra note 38 (providing examples of state exemptions); see also Ann E. Beeson, Comment,
Dances with Justice: Peyotism in the Courts, 41 EMORY L. J. 1121, 1140-42 (1992) (discussing
nonuniformity of state and federal restrictions).
Unbeknownst to most people, one of the two respondents in the Smith case was a non-
Indian, Galen Black. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Black v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources, 480 U.S. 916 (1987) (No. 86-946). Nowhere in the many Smith opinions does a court
acknowledge that Black was a non-Indian. Throughout the action's journey through the courts,
Galen Black's beliefs were found to be sincere. At one point, however, the Court of Appeals of
Oregon actually remanded the case to the Employment Appeals Board for factual findings
regarding Galen Black's sincerity. Black v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 707
P.2d 1274, 1280 (Or. Ct. App. 1985). After these findings were made, they were accepted by
the Supreme Court of Oregon. Black v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 721 P.2d
451, 454 (Or. 1986). The Supreme Court of the United States agreed, stating, "[it is undisputed
that respondents['] ... religious beliefs are sincere . . " Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 663 (1988).
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will rule on a possible extension of the exemption to
non-Indian members of the NAC. "Nowhere is it even suggested that the exemption applies only
to Indian members of the Native American Church. Had the intention been to exclude non-Indian
members ... the language ... would have so clearly provided." Boyl, 774 F. Supp. at 1338;
see supra note 37 (providing language of regulation); see also supra notes 61-62 and
accompanying text (discussing non-Indian NAC member claim). Therefore, non-Indian members
of the Native American Church should enjoy equal treatment. Nevertheless, the problem remains:
sincere non-Indian peyotists that are not members of the Native American Church remain
uncovered by any exemption. Examples of existing non-Indian peyotist churches include the
following: "Peyote Way," which was founded by a member of the Native American Church,
Immanuel Trujillo, Thornburgh, 922 F.2d at 1212 "Native American Church of New York,"
which has no affiliation with the NAC, Native Am. Church of N.Y. v. United States, 468 F.
Supp. 1247, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980) and "Church of the
Awakening," Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1115 (1973).
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Peyote is considered the cornerstone of peyotist religions. 16  Thus,
state and federal courts have held that a prohibition of its use constitutes a
substantial burden:' "To forbid the use of peyote is to remove the
theological heart of Peyotism."18 Therefore, in the case of peyote, it
appears that a finding of sincerity will inevitably necessitate a finding of
burden if use is prohibited.
Finally, only the strict scrutiny analysis remains. Two federal courts,
the lower court in Peyote Wy Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh"9 and
the district court in United States v. Wrner,2 ° applied the strict scrutiny
rubric mandated by Congress in RFRAI2 ' free exercise claims of non-
Indians that were not members of the NAC. Both courts refused to extend
the exemption. 2
Strict scrutiny requires the government to first show a compelling
interest for its action.'2 Justice Blacknun's dissent in Smith, arguing
that a compelling interest against religious use of peyote by sincere
practitioners was non-existent, is now the law with respect to Indians and
NAC members.'24 Understandably, his comments regarding peyote are
116 See, e.g., Whittingham, 504 P.2d at 952 (granting non-Indian exemption without relying
on regulation). "Suffice it to say.. .Peyotism is not a twentieth century cult nor a fad subject
to extinction at a whim. . . .The religion is established with a following of several hundred
thousand believers." Id. The AIRFA Amendments, see supra note 9, also seem to permit the
assumption that peyote is a bona fide religious choice.
See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Boyll, 774 F. Supp. at 1341; Woody, 394 P.2d at 818.
"I Woody, 394 P.2d at 818; see Cynthia S. Mazur, Marijuana as a 'Holy Sacrament': Is the
Use of Peyote Constitutionally Distinguishable From That of Marijuana in Bona Fide Religious
Ceremonies?, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 693, 694 (1991) (stating it is believed
that peyote enables one to establish direct contact with God and develop increased compassion
for others).
"9 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991); see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing
Thornburgh case). It is unfortunate that the Fifth Circuit in Thornburgh heard the case after the
Smith decision, which prevented then from applying strict scrutiny.
17 595 F. Supp. 595, 597-98 (D.N.D. 1984). The claimants unsuccessfully argued that they
were members of the Native American Church. Id. The court assumed sincerity and burden, but
would not accept their claim that they were non-Indian members of the NAC. But see supra note
115 (discussing apparent acceptance of non-Indian members). Thus, Warner can be viewed as a
non-NAC case.
'"' See supra note 17 (providing compelling interest test).
'" See Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 599; Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Meese, 698 F.
Supp. 1342, 1346 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v.
Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).
' See supra note 17 (providing components of strict scrutiny analysis).
11 Compare Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 918
(1990) (Blackmun J., dissenting) (stating that exemption should apply only to NAC members
whether Indian or non-Indian) with H.R. REP. No. 675, supra note 46 (discussing need for
legislation to assure uniform protection of religious use of peyote by Indians only).
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equally valid for those non-Indian bona fide practitioners not affiliated with
the NAC. Moreover, the congressional findings of the AIRFA Amend-
ments permitting the religious use of peyote seem to track his reasoning.
Thus, it will be difficult for a court to deny the lack of a compelling state
interest. Therefore, when one examines the compelling interests proffered
by courts in conjunction with the recent legislative action, it is clear that
non-Indians similarly situated to peyotist Indians should be permitted to
practice their religion."z
One such compelling government interest acknowledged by the court
in Warner was that of combating the growing illegal drug market in the
United States. 126 Although protecting the citizens of the United States
from drugs and drug trafficking is undeniably a compelling interest,
Congress has determined that peyote does not implicate such issues,Iv
espousing the view that there is "practically no illegal traffic in peyo-
te."'28 Thus, it appears that there is insufficient empirical evidence to
12. See United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1342 (D.N.M. 1991) ("Finding no
compelling interest to justify the constitutional infringement at issue, the Court need not reach the
often critical question of balancing two competing interests.").
" Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 598. The court pointed to the findings of the legislature in
passing the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. The purpose of the Act was to "deal in a
comprehensive fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States." Id.; see also
H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566.
4567.
127 See H.R. REP. No. 675, supra note 46, at 3 ("[P]eyote is not injurious to the Indian
religious user .... Courts which have made factual findings regarding the religious use of
peyote by Indians have concluded that such use is not harmful."), see also D. Brett Brewer,
Constitutional Law: The Peyote Decision: A Restriction upon All Religions?, 44 OKLA. L. REV.
715, 722-23 (1991) (declaring invalid concern that peyote would contribute to drug problem in
United States).
US Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 916 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Congressional findings regarding the innocuous nature of peyote
are clear when peyote is distinguished from other drugs. See, e.g., Olsen v. Drug Enforcement
Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J.) (providing DEA findings that
marijuana and peyote are very different), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 906 (1990); United States v.
Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 451 (D.D.C. 1968) (holding that unlike peyote, Congress determined
marijuana is hazardous to health); see also Brewer, supra note 127, at 722 (distinguishing peyote
from marijuana).
In Olsen, the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") denied a claimant's petition for
a religion-based exemption from federal laws proscribing the use of marijuana. 878 F.2d at 1463.
The Fifth Circuit adopted the DEA's empirical findings regarding the differences between peyote
and marijuana. Id. The DEA provided the court with data emphasizing the vast difference
between marijuana and peyote in terms of abuse, availability, demand and overall pervasiveness
in American society. Id. (citing DEA's Final Order, No. 86-1442, at 2 (July 26, 1988). For
example, between 1980 and 1987, over 15 million pounds of marijuana were seized by the DEA
in contrast to under 20 pounds of peyote. Id. (citing DEA's Final Order, No. 86-1442, at 2 (July
26, 1988). But see Mazur, supra note 118 at 720 (stating that court accepted DEA data about
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warrant governmental focus on peyote in its battle against drug abuse and
trafficking as suggested by the Wrner court.
A second reason presented for limiting the peyote use exemption to
Indians is the high potential for abuse and the accompanying threat to the
public health, safety, and welfare.'29  Courts have, however, questioned
the motives behind this interest because it displays less concern for Indians
who are at liberty to use peyote. 3  Moreover, in passing the AIRFA
Amendments, Congress noted that peyote is neither addictive nor
harmful.131 Therefore, because of the insufficient harmful effects of
peyote, the government does not have a "compelling" interest in limiting
the exemption to Indians.'32
A third interest which may be proffered by the government as
"compelling" is the preservation of Native American culture. 33  Before
the AIRFA Amendments were passed, however, the federal drug laws
applied only to members of the NAC. Therefore, Indians who were not
NAC members could not benefit from the exemption; in fact, some of the
predominantly non-Indian peyotist churches which argued for and were
marijuana use without examining current trends). Moreover, these differences were recently relied
upon by Congress in enacting the AIRFA Amendments. See AIRFA Amendments, supra note 9,
at 3125-27. Additionally, the House of Representatives has repeatedly stressed that the religious
use of peyote has nothing to do with the drug abuse and drug trafficking problems extant in the
United States. See H.R. REP. No. 675, supra note 46; Kuch, 288 F. Supp. at 451.
'29 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 916.
'3 See United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1342 (D.N.M. 1991) (stating that
prosecution of defendant appeared to be driven by religious or racial insensitivity). "In the
absence of evidence, we cannot simply assume that the psychedelic is so baneful that its use must
be prohibited to a group of [non-Indian] members but poses no equal threat when used by [Indi-
ans]." Id. (quotations omitted). It is important, however, to note that there is no evidence to show
that all Indians are peyotists. Yet non-peyotist Indians can fraudulently seize upon the broader
exemption and use peyote despite insincere beliefs. This leaves us with the untenable proposition
that fraudulent Indian use is less harmful to society than sincere non-Indian peyotists practicing
with sincere beliefs.
131 H.R. REP. No. 675, supra note 46, at 3; see State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950, 953
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1973). In Whittingham, the court stated that "[t]he uncontroverted evidence on
the record [is] that peyote is not. . . habitforming. The fact that the use of peyote will not result
in addiction is crucial because the State would have a great interest in protecting its citizens from
drug abuse." Id.
32 Another tangential reason the Warner Court refused to extend the exemption was that
peyote did not have a currently accepted medical use. This has again been contradicted by the
finding of Congress in enacting the AIRFA Amendments. H.R. REP. No. 675, supra note 46,
at 3. The House noted that medical experts have testified that peyote helps curb alcohol abuse and
alcoholism. Id.
"I See Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir.
1991) ("We hold that the federal NAC exemption allowing tribal Native Americans to continue
their centuries-old tradition of peyote use is rationally related to the legitimate governmental
objective of preserving Native American culture.").
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denied equal religious rights had Indian members.134  Moreover, the
extension of the exemption to non-Indian NAC members 31 seems to
fortify the assertion that Indian cultural preservation is a secondary
concern 36 and has never risen to the level of a "compelling" government
interest. Thus, neither drug trafficking concerns, peyote's physical effects,
nor the government's interest in preserving Native American culture pass
muster under the first prong of the strict scrutiny test.1
37
Assuming that a compelling interest could be offered, the government
must also prove that the statute is necessary to serve that interest.
38
Peyote use and possession is presently monitored by regulations with
criminal sanctions available. 39  It would seem to be in the interests of
both parties for the government to know which churches sacramentally use
peyote. Such knowledge would limit the numerous unnecessary arrests and
the harassment of bona fide users noted by Congress. 41 One need only
review the number of people arrested for the use of peyote' 4t to know
that an administrative agency can thwart the unauthorized use of peyote and
facilitate the bona fide practice of peyotist religions whether Indian or non-
Indian. Thus, the interest of the government can be served by less
restrictive means.
The gravity of the problems in our society created by the misuse of
and addiction to certain drugs is not to be denied. Many drugs that are
strictly monitored, however, still inundate our nation. 42 The extension
of the current exemptions to bona fide non-Indian churches sincerely
'34 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (providing evidence that Indians have been
adversely affected by restricting exemption); see also Thornburgh, 922 F.2d at 1212.
"3 See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (discussing Boyll case which extended NAC
exemption to non-Indian).
36 See United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D.N.M. 1991) ("Nowhere is it even
suggested that the exemption applies only to Indian members of the Native American Church.").
131 Id. at 1342. ("Finding no compelling interest to justify the constitutional infringement at
issue, the Court need not reach the often critical question of balancing two competing interests.").
'38 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting that action must be narrowly tailored
to serve interest).
,39 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (providing regulations).
140 See H.R. REP. No. 675, supra note 46, at 4.
14' See, e.g., United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991), appeal dismissed,
968 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1992); State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974).
'41 See, e.g., Bradley Graham, Military Eye on the Skies Switches Focus from Cold War to
Drug War; Smuggling: Radar Can Spot Drug-Running Planes but the System's Expense Raises
Questions About Its Efficiency, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at A35 (discussing military's struggle
to prevent illegal drugs from entering United States); Camille Harper, A Prisoner in a Gang-Run
Neighborhood, No Escaping Violent Hand of the Pushers, CHI. SUN TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, at 14
(commenting on oppression of living in drug-infested community).
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practicing Native American religions will not engender a burgeoning of
peyotist religions. One reason is simply that it is well established that bona
fide peyotist religions abhor the non-religious use of peyote. 43 Another
is the outright scarcity of peyote.1" Therefore, it is doubtful that the use
of peyote by bona fide non-Indian religions will unduly burden the govern-
ment's purpose.
A sincere non-Indian practitioner of a Native American religion will
easily meet the claimant's burden: sincerity and infringement. Further, it
appears that Congress has directly contradicted the compelling interests
offered by courts to limit the use of peyote to those statutorily accommo-
dated. Therefore, non-Indian peyotists should not be hindered in the
legitimate practice of their religion.
CONCLUSION
A strict equal protection analysis need not apply to Native Americans
for non-Indians to enjoy equal religious freedom. In fact, Equal Protection
and Establishment Clause claims, long barred by the principles of Morton
v. Mancari, may result in the abolition of exemptions for all claimants.
Rationalizing unequal treatment of non-Indians and Indians in the area of
religious exercise through the unique status of Indians, however, should no
longer be tolerated.
The recent enactments of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and
the Amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act provide
the means for expanding Indian liberty to similarly situated non-Indians.
Equal treatment of Indians and non-Indians, and the lack of preference for
any one religion, are mandated by the Constitution and are fulfilled when
the Supreme Court applies the same test to all religious claims. The
existing statutory exemptions establish that the government's interests are
susceptible to subordination to a fundamental right. To hold that such a
right must be that of a person with a tribal or specific denominational
affiliation is unconstitutional. If the courts actually adhere to the
constitutionally mandated principle that the government's interest in
protecting Indians' religious freedom is no greater than its interest in
protecting the religious freedom of others, non-Indians shall be provided
113 E.g., Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (-[F]or
members of the Native American Church, use of peyote outside the ritual is sacrilegious."), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 906 (1990).
' See For Indian Church, A Critical Shortage, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 1995, at A10. The
article states that there is already a serious threat to peyotist religions due to the scarcity of
peyote. Id. Peyote is only found in small areas of Texas and Mexico. Id.
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the same religious freedom accorded their Indian brethren by law.
Francis X. Santangelo
